

Congressional Voters


17.251/252

Fall 2016

Turnout

(Figure 5.1 updated)

Figure 5.1: Turnout in Congressional Elections, 1930-2014



*Actual congressional turnout is likely less than this.


How to Calculate Turnout Pct.

- Turnout Pct. = Turnout / VAP





not

- Turnout / Registered
- New measure: Turnout / Voting eligible population


Turnout/VEP vs. Turnout/VAP 2014





Variation in Turnout 2008 - 2014 (c.f. Fig 5.2)



Correlation in Turnout 2008 to 2010



Primary & General Election Turnout, 2000



Explaining (Non-)Voting


- Expected value of voting =
 - Benefit the individual receives as a consequence of the election outcome
 - Minus the cost of voting

Explaining (Non-)Voting

State of the World w/out Citizen's Vote	Net Benefit if Citizen Abstains	Net Benefit if Citizen Votes	Condition under which Citizen Should Vote
<i>D</i> wins by more than 1 vote	B^D_{Citizen}	$B^D_{\text{Citizen}} - c$	Never
<i>D</i> wins by exactly 1 vote	B^D_{Citizen}	$B^D_{\text{Citizen}} - c$	Never
<i>D</i> and <i>R</i> tie	$(B^D_{\text{Citizen}} + B^R_{\text{Citizen}})/2$	$B^D_{\text{Citizen}} - c$	$(B^D_{\text{Citizen}} - B^R_{\text{Citizen}})/2 > c$
<i>R</i> wins by exactly 1 vote	B^R_{Citizen}	$(B^D_{\text{Citizen}} + B^R_{\text{Citizen}})/2 - c$	$(B^D_{\text{Citizen}} - B^R_{\text{Citizen}})/2 > c$
<i>R</i> wins by more than 1 vote	B^R_{Citizen}	$B^R_{\text{Citizen}} - c$	Never

Salvaging the Calculus

- Citizen duty
- Think about it probabilistically, not deterministically
 - Candidate differential
 - Costs of voting
 - Closeness of election
 - Voter attention
 - GOTV





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. reg tv
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Source	SS	MS	Number of obs = 433			
Model	2.1029e+11	2.1029e+11	F(1, 431)	=	72.45	
Residual	1.2510e+12	2.9025e+09	Prob > F	=	0.0000	
Total	1.4613e+12	3.3826e+09	R-squared	=	0.1439	
			Adj R-squared	=	0.1419	
			Root MSE	=	53875	

tvotes2012	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]
marginpct	-897.7943	105.4763	-8.51	0.000	-1105.106 -690.4824
_cons	313335.6	4447.584	70.45	0.000	304594 322077.3

2012 & 2014



. reg tv

Source	SS	MS	Number of obs =
Model	2.1029e+11	2.1029e+11	433
Residual	1.2510e+12	2.9025e+09	F(1, 431) = 72.45
Total	1.4613e+12	3.3826e+09	Prob > F = 0.0000
			R-squared = 0.1439
			Adj R-squared = 0.1419
			Root MSE = 53875

tvotes2012	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]
marginpct	-897.7943	105.4763	-8.51	0.000	-1105.106 -690.4824
_cons	313335.6	4447.584	70.45	0.000	304594 322077.3

. reg turnout marginpct

Source	SS	df	MS	Number of obs =
Model	2.6951e+11	1	2.6951e+11	435
Residual	1.1997e+12	433	2.7706e+09	F(1, 433) = 97.27
Total	1.4692e+12	434	3.3852e+09	Prob > F = 0.0000
				R-squared = 0.1834
				Adj R-squared = 0.1816
				Root MSE = 52637


turnout	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]
marginpct	-960.4847	97.38473	-9.86	0.000	-1151.89 -769.0791
_cons	215402.7	4465.676	48.24	0.000	206625.6 224179.8

Who is hurt/helped by turnout

- Naïve view: Dems helped by turnout

Who is hurt/helped by turnout

- District view: the “out party”



Deciding whom to support

- Ideology
 - Downsian logic directly
- Party ID
 - Downsian logic by proxy

PID x IDEO in 2014

	Dem.	Ind.	Rep.	Missing	Total
Liberal	10,927	2,742	380	797	14,846
Moderate	6,359	7,606	2,385	1,469	17,819
Conserv.	2,057	4,510	10,120	1,670	18,357
Missing	1,085	1,094	343	2,656	5,178
Total	20,428	15,952	13,228	6,592	56,200

Source: 2014 Cooperative Congressional Election Study

Party and Ideology Distance as Explanatory Factors in 2014 Cong'l Elections

House	Party of voter			
Ideol.	Dem.	Ind.	Rep.	Total
Lib.	.96	.86	.23	.92
Mod.	.88	.51	.14	.59
Cons.	.76	.11	.04	.13
Total	.90	.40	.06	.47

Senate	Ideology of voter			
Ideol.	Dem.	Ind.	Rep.	Total
Lib.	.98	.90	.22	.94
Mod.	.90	.55	.17	.62
Cons.	.83	.09	.03	.12
Total	.93	.41	.05	.46

Source: 2014 CCES

Overall voting effect, 2014 Cong'l election

		House	Senate
Party identification	Effect of changing from an Ind. to a Dem.	0.30 (0.003)	0.30 (0.01)
Ideology	Effect of changing from a mod. to a lib.	0.20 (0.003)	0.21 (0.01)
Democratic incumbent	Effect of changing from an open seat race to a Dem. Inc.	0.085 (0.002)	0.052 (0.009)
Constant		0.50 (0.002)	0.50 (0.007)
R ²		.58	.61
N		28,303	14,946

A Word about Primaries


- Party not a useful cue
- Not much research, but.....
 - Primary voters are different from general election voters
 - Primary voters are more ideologically extreme, but
 - Primary voters are more strategically sophisticated than general election voters
 - Don't underestimate the “friends and neighbors” effect

Voting rates in 2010 House primary


	Didn't vote	Voted in Dem. pri.	Voted in Rep. pri.	Voted in another pri.	Don't recall
Rep.	32.6%	2.6%	59.2%	0.6%	5.0%
Ind.	57.3%	12.4%	21.1%	3.0%	6.2%
Dem.	42.2%	49.1%	1.1%	0.7%	7.0%
Total	44.5%	23.7%	24.2%	1.4%	6.2%

Source: Cooperative Congressional Election Study, 2010
(Question not asked in 2014)


Democrats




Republicans



Other



All



Average ideology of primary voters, 2010

	Didn't vote	Voted in Dem. pri.	Voted in Rep. pri.	Voted in another pri.	Don't recall	Total
Rep.	1.41	1.16	1.86	1.42	1.20	1.66
Ind.	0.15	-0.19	1.33	0.59	0.27	0.39
Dem.	-0.80	-0.91	-0.62	-0.97	-0.59	-0.84
Total	0.07	-0.71	1.66	0.44	0.14	0.29

-3 = strong liberal

0 = moderate

+3 = strong conservative

Std. dev., ideology of primary voters, 2010

	Didn't vote	Voted in Dem. pri.	Voted in Rep. pri.	Voted in another pri.	Don't recall	Total
Rep.	1.14	1.42	1.01	1.25	1.28	1.11
Ind.	1.36	1.37	1.17	1.48	1.40	1.43
Dem.	1.45	1.45	1.42	1.82	1.51	1.46
Total	1.58	1.50	1.14	1.66	1.58	1.69

-3 = strong liberal


0 = moderate

+3 = strong conservative


An aside about primary rules: Run-off vs. plurality rule

- Most states: plurality
- The South: the white primary → runoff elections
- California's "top-two primary"
 - (really like Louisiana's "Jungle Primary")
- Interest in "instant runoff"

Spatial representation of runoff primary (Figure 6.2)



Spatial representation of runoff primary (Figure 6.2)



Ahler, Citrin, and Lenz research

Please read Ahler, Douglas J., Jack Citrin, and Gabriel S. Lenz. "[Do Open Primaries Improve Representation? An Experimental Test of California's 2012 Top - Two Primary.](#)" *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 41, no. 2 (2016): 237-268.

Then read...

Ahler, Douglas, Jack Citrin, and Gabriel Lenz. "[Can California's New Primary Reduce Polarization? Maybe Not.](#)" *The Monkey Cage*. March 27, 2013.

Main Findings

- Voters generally can't place candidates ideologically
 - Incumbents better placed than challengers
 - Co-partisan candidates are indistinguishable
 - Parties' candidates distinguishable from each other
- When placed, voters tend to place candidates more centrally than they are

2014: District 4 (Central Valley)

In District 4, incumbent Rep. Tom McClintock made the runoff with fellow Republican Art Moore. McClintock is a conservative and friend of the tea party, while his challenger has positioned himself as the moderate alternative -- a reverse of the “establishment v. tea party” narrative that has plagued this primary cycle.

“If McClintock wins,” however, Rarick says, “the system didn't work.”*

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*Ethan Rarick, Director of UCB Center for Politics and Public Service, IGS

Rep. Tom McClintock

Representative from California's 4th District
Republican

Elected Positions

DATES	TITLE	STATE / DISTRICT
2009-2016	Representative	California's 4 th District

See Also: [McClintock's Official Website](#) | [@RepMcClintock](#) | [OpenSecrets](#) | [VoteSmart](#) | [Bioguide](#) | [C-SPAN](#)



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Fall 2016

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